Abstract. We use data provided by firms to the Internal Revenue Service regarding their true foreign subsidiary locations to show that some firms fail to publicly disclose subsidiaries in some countries, even when the subsidiaries are significant and should be disclosed per Security and Exchange Commission rules. The propensity to omit significant subsidiaries is especially strong when subsidiaries are in tax havens, and when the firm is more highly scrutinized by the media, suggesting firms believe there are reputational costs associated with operations in tax havens. Additionally, we find evidence that firms that omit significant subsidiaries are more likely to restate financial results and are more likely to receive an SEC comment letter when compared to firms that do not omit significant subsidiaries. These findings suggest that subsidiary omission may be indicative of broader disclosure and accounting choices made by the firm. JEL Codes: M41, M48, H25, H26
Introduction
Over the past three decades, U.S. enterprises have become increasingly multinational in scope as they seek to expand opportunities in consumer, labor, and financial markets (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2017) . Operating in multiple jurisdictions exposes enterprises to myriad risks that accompany diverse legal, cultural, and financial systems around the world. Moreover, multinational firms are exposed to disjointed tax rules across countries, creating opportunities for income shifting, treaty shopping, and other forms of tax planning. Indeed, the significant nature of foreign operations may affect the costs and benefits of related disclosures, as these disclosures have the potential reveal unsavory glimpses into the firm's tax avoidance activities, exposure to complex geopolitical risks,
and other factors about a company's operational positions. Despite the changing nature of the multinational business environment, disclosure requirements for publicly traded U.S.
multinational firms related to foreign operations have changed very little in the past few decades, and existing disclosures have not been studied extensively.
One disclosure related to multinational operations that has received increasing attention in recent years is the list of "significant" subsidiaries found in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K, required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Exhibit 21 is used by investors to identify "systemic risk, firm interconnectivity" and "understand complex structures employed by some firms." 1 The SEC requires firms to disclose the name and jurisdiction of incorporation for all significant subsidiaries. 2 Academics have used Exhibit 21 information over the past decade to estimate exposure to specific countries (Dyreng et al. 2012 ) and as a proxy for various tax avoidance strategies that require legal operations in tax haven countries (e.g., Higgins et al. 2015;  1 See the letter from the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisorycommittee-2012/iac-approved-letter-reg-sk-comment-letter-062016.pdf. 2 A significant subsidiary is one whose income or assets are 10 percent or more of the consolidated firm's income or assets. For the complete regulations regarding subsidiary disclosure, see Appendix 1. Law and Mills 2017; Law and Mills 2014) . Reporters and nonprofits have also used Exhibit 21 disclosures to criticize companies with operations in tax haven countries (e.g., Phillips et al. 2016) .
Surprisingly, however, little is understood about the information contained in Exhibit 21. Do firms strategically decide which subsidiaries to disclose and which to omit? What factors drive the decision to disclose versus omit a subsidiary from Exhibit 21? Are firms complying with the disclosure requirements as set forth by the SEC?
We undertake the first comprehensive study of information contained in Exhibit 21. 3 We compare foreign subsidiary information contained in Exhibit 21 with a comprehensive dataset of U.S. multinational firms' foreign subsidiaries obtained from IRS tax filings for the years [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . 4 We find evidence of under-disclosure in Exhibit 21 and find that the omitted information is correlated with a variety of firm and subsidiary characteristics. First, we show that firms are more likely to withhold disclosure of subsidiaries located in tax haven countries relative to other countries. This finding suggests firms incur significant reputational costs when disclosing subsidiaries located in tax haven countries, most likely because tax haven countries are known to facilitate tax avoidance activities. Consistent with this explanation, the propensity to withhold disclosure doubles when the subsidiaries are in a so-called "dot" haven such as Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, where the primary purpose of the subsidiary is likely tax avoidance, as opposed to subsidiaries in other tax havens with larger economies such 3 Numerous studies use Exhibit 21 data. See, for example, (Akamah et al. 2017; Dyreng and Markle 2016; Lisowsky 2010; De Simone et al. 2017; Heckemeyer et al. 2017; Dyreng et al. 2015; Bozanic et al. 2017; Demere et al. 2016; Law and Mills 2017; Chow et al. 2017; Law and Mills 2014; Hanlon et al. 2015; Dyreng and Lindsey 2009; Dyreng et al. 2013; Dyreng et al. 2012; Black et al. 2014; Dyreng et al. 2017) . However, ours is the first study to comprehensively examine information in and systematic underdisclosure of data in 10-K Exhibit 21 filings. 4 We use the universe of Form 5471, "Information Return of U.S. Persons With Respect to Certain Foreign Corporations." 5 This lack of disclosure may also exist elsewhere in the annual report. For example, Akamah et al. (2017) find more aggregation of segment-level disclosures if the segment is related to a tax haven location.
as Ireland, Singapore or Switzerland, where primary purpose of the subsidiary could more plausibly be a non-tax economic factor of production.
Second, we show that the nondisclosure of significant subsidiaries is more likely when the firm is more highly scrutinized in the media. Media reports often focus on firms' tax planning strategies, including subsidiary locations, and anecdotal evidence suggests the media may obtain subsidiary information from Exhibit 21. 6 In Figure 1 we plot the number of instances major media outlets downloaded an Exhibit 21 from EDGAR, the SEC's database of firms' financial filings, by year, from 2004 to 2013, and we note a steady increase. 7 Consistent with this rise in scrutiny, we find that media coverage is positively associated with the likelihood of subsidiary nondisclosure.
We also find that media coverage is only associated with nondisclosure of subsidiaries located in tax haven countries; we find no evidence that media coverage has an effect on nondisclosure of subsidiaries that are not in tax haven countries.
Third, we move beyond the idea that firms bear costs when disclosing information related to their tax avoidance activities and test whether firms also perceive costs to disclosure of subsidiaries in countries with high political risks. Multinational firms are subjected to the political systems of all countries they operate in, and these risks vary substantially from one country to another. Researchers have shown that political risk is real and is recognized by market participants (Bekaert et al. 2014; Clark 1997; Erb et al. 1996; Butler and Joaquin 1998) . To the extent that firms may desire to minimize public scrutiny of their exposure to geopolitical risks, they may choose to withhold disclosure of subsidiaries in particularly risky countries. Accordingly, we find 6 See, for example, https://www.bna.com/thousands-subsidiaries-go-n57982079146/. 7 We use the same methodology as Bozanic et al. (2017) to isolate downloaders from the SEC's EDGAR database by using the IP address of the downloader. We obtain the IP address from 17 different media outlets that downloaded Exhibit 21's over this time period. The New York Times downloaded by far the most Exhibit 21's, downloading 294 of the 821 total downloads we document.
that nondisclosure of significant subsidiaries is more likely when the subsidiary is located in a relatively politically risky country.
Finally, we examine whether firms' omission of significant subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21 disclosures is associated with other negative signals about financial reporting quality. In particular, we examine whether under-disclosing firms are more likely to restate their financial statements or receive a comment letter from the SEC. Here, we provide evidence that firms with Exhibit 21 omissions are more likely to restate their financial statements and receive SEC comment letters.
Our study has important implications for existing research and for public policies regarding disclosure. First, our findings suggest some firms are sensitive to public scrutiny levied on companies that have operations in tax haven countries, consistent with recent research that shows multinational firms are under an increasingly bright public spotlight with regard to their international tax planning and tax haven operations EY 2014; Hoopes et al. 2016 ). Public scrutiny, media attention, and political rhetoric regarding tax planning are at an alltime high (Graham et al. 2014 ) and firms are eager to shield themselves from the attention that they receive when they are perceived as overly aggressive tax planners.
Relatedly, our findings also contribute to a growing literature that examines how reputational costs drive firm decisions, highlighting not only the existence of reputational costs of tax reporting (Gallemore et al. 2014; Austin and Wilson 2015; Graham et al. 2014 ), but also the relationship between tax and financial reporting disclosure decisions. In the case of Exhibit 21 disclosures, firms may withhold disclosure of some significant subsidiaries to hide tax avoidance information from the public even though the information they are hiding is known to the IRS, the very agency charged with ensuring compliance with tax laws and despite their tax planning likely being legal.
Second, our study shows that firms ignore mandatory disclosure requirements if the costs of disclosure are high relative to the costs of noncompliance, especially in the case of reputation damaging tax-related disclosures. To our knowledge, no firm has ever been fined by the SEC for failure to disclose significant subsidiaries on Exhibit 21, suggesting that the costs of noncompliance with this requirement is low. On the other hand, reputational costs of compliance may be high, particularly for firms with many subsidiaries in tax havens or politically-risky countries. Leuz and Wysocki (2016) call for research investigating the real effects of disclosure and reporting regulation. Notably, most disclosure models take as given that firms' disclosures are truthful. The results of our study suggest that in some settings, the benefits of not complying with mandatory disclosure exceed the costs. Indeed, our study suggests firms are not blind followers of all disclosure requirements, but strategically weigh the costs and benefits of required disclosure, and only comply when the benefits of mandatory disclosure are sufficiently high relative to the costs.
Third, our results are also relevant to recent policy changes with regard to country-bycountry reporting of financial and tax information. In an effort to curb tax avoidance across international borders, some countries -including the U.S. -have recently instituted regulations requiring firms to report financial results and tax payments on a country-by-country basis. Some countries are considering requiring that these disclosures be made public (OECD 2014; Cockfield and MacArthur 2015; Hoopes 2016) . Our findings suggest that firm compliance with publicly disclosed country-by-country reporting requirements may hinge critically on the requirements being clearly delineated and rigorously enforced.
Our results are also relevant to current discussions surrounding proposed changes to Regulation S-K. The SEC is currently considering whether firms should be required to provide to obscure information about foreign locations, but not other types of information? While our study cannot address these questions in full, it lays a foundation upon which future research can begin to explore the many questions our results raise.
Background and Hypotheses
The most granular required disclosure specifically designed to provide investors with information on the scope of a firm's geographic footprint is Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K required by SEC regulation S-K. 10 This regulation requires that firms disclose the name and jurisdiction of incorporation of all significant subsidiaries, where significance is defined as any subsidiary whose assets are greater than 10% of consolidated assets or whose income is greater than 10% of consolidated income. Moreover, any undisclosed subsidiary should also be disclosed if, when (Gunn and Michas 2017) , and earnings management (Dyreng et al. 2012) . Despite its frequent use as a proxy for geographic exposure, little is understood about the quality of the disclosure, and some anecdotal evidence suggests that firms may not fully comply with the requirement to disclose the name and location of all significant subsidiaries. For example, media reports and non-profit activist groups suggest some firms may strategically stop disclosing some of their subsidiary information to avoid public scrutiny. 11 Likewise, using publicly available information, Gramlich and Whiteakre-Poe (2013) document the cases of two large public firms whose Exhibit 21 disclosures appeared to change dramatically year over year, without accompanying evidence that the subsidiaries had been disposed of. Indeed, some research argues that firms with dramatic decreases in the number of subsidiaries listed on Exhibit 21 have lower effective tax rates, suggesting that the changes were designed to hide information about the firm's tax avoidance activities (Herbert et al. 2016) .
These anecdotes and studies suggest that, even though Exhibit 21 is a required disclosure, some firms may not disclose all their significant subsidiaries to avoid public scrutiny. This type of disclosure failure is consistent with the findings of , who found that about half of the FTSE 100 failed to disclose some of their subsidiaries. While the UK case is different from the US because of different disclosure requirements, enforcement regimes, and plausibly different public attitudes towards tax planning, it does suggest that firms may ignore mandatory disclosure requirements, especially if the disclosure might be used by the press or other entities to paint the firm in a negative light.
Indeed, the incentives to not fully disclose all information on Exhibit 21 are clear-based on a firm's subsidiary locations, one can gain insights into a firm's tax planning, its dealings with countries that are not seen as savory trading partners, and its exposure to geographic, geopolitical, and other risks. For example, the presence of subsidiaries in the Cayman Islands or Bermuda for a large industrial firm may suggest that the firm is using those subsidies for tax planning purposes, as small islands are not known to be, for example, particularly well-suited manufacturing locations.
Likewise, the presence of a subsidiary in Venezuela might suggest the firm's assets could be expropriated by the government because of the unstable economic and political environment.
What is not clear from prior research is whether the incentives to conceal subsidiary information are sufficient to induce firms to violate SEC disclosure rules. One challenge in evaluating the possibility that firms withhold information that is required to be disclosed is that it is often difficult to observe the counterfactual; what has been disclosed is observable, but what should have been disclosed is unobservable. We overcome this obstacle using private data filed with the IRS that provides information on all foreign subsidiaries. Using this data, we can compare the information disclosed to the public with complete information provided privately to the IRS thereby observing whether the public disclosures are complete. 
Data and Sample Selection
In this study we combine data from three main sources: 1) Exhibit 21 of 
Exhibit 21
Public firms in the U.S. are required to disclose the name and jurisdiction of incorporation for all significant subsidiaries. SEC regulations provide three bright line tests to determine whether a subsidiary is "significant" and thus required to be disclosed in Exhibit 21. Satisfying any of the tests requires disclosure. The tests are (1) the parent's and its other subsidiaries' investments in (advances to) a given subsidiary exceed 10 percent of consolidated parent assets; (2) the parent's 12 Other studies that have had similar ability to compare disclosure to truth include Bens, Berger and Monahan (2011) , who compare segment disclosures with private Census data on manufacturing facilities, and Gleason and Mills (2002) , who compare disclosures related to the income tax contingency (before the adoption of FIN 48) to IRS data on tax contingencies, and Gow, Wahid, and Yu (2017) , who compare directors' disclosed biographical information to directors' actual biographies.
proportionate share of the subsidiary's assets exceeds 10 percent of consolidated parent assets; (3) the parent's proportionate share of the subsidiary's pretax income before extraordinary items exceeds 10 percent of the consolidated parent's pretax income. Appendix 1 provides the complete SEC regulations for significant subsidiary disclosures in Exhibit 21.
We gather data from Exhibit 21 using a text search program as described in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009 parent. 16, 17 Using this data, we can determine the location of each subsidiary and whether it should be considered significant under the SEC rules governing Exhibit 21 described above (i.e., whether the parent's proportionate share of subsidiary assets exceeds 10 percent of the consolidated firm's total assets). 18 That is, we use data from Form 5471 to identify the true location of firms' significant subsidiaries so we can compare to the publicly disclosed subsidiaries on Exhibit 21.
It is clearly possible that firms strategically omit filing Form 5471 for some subsidiaries in an attempt to withhold information from tax authorities. However, failing to file Form 5471, carries significant penalties for noncompliance so we believe compliance is high. 19 Specifically, IRC §6038(b) allows for a $10,000 fine for every subsidiary not disclosed every year the disclosure is not made, plus $10,000 per month per subsidiary if the non-disclosure persists for more than 90 16 There are several criteria that require U.S. taxpayers must file Form 5471, including if they own (acquire) at least 10 percent of a foreign corporation, had control of such corporation during the year, or U.S. taxpayers control the corporation and the firm owns at least 10 percent of the stock of that corporation (see Form 5471, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i5471.pdf). 17 In some cases, the country code of the firm is not based on a commonly used standardized country code schema (ISO, the IRS's schema, etc.). In these instances, we hand-categorize subsidiaries to countries. Omitting these difficult to interpret country codes does not change our inferences. 18 The Form 5471 data is not sufficiently granular to determine whether a given subsidiary is significant with respect to investments in or proportionate share of pre-tax income before extraordinary items (significant subsidiary definitions 1 and 3 above). To the degree that firms fail the asset test, but would satisfy one of these alternative tests, we may understate significance. We multiply the percentage ownership from Form 5471 by the subsidiaries assets to compute the firm's proportionate share of subsidiary assets. If the Form 5471 for a given subsidiary is missing the percentage ownership, we use the Form 5471 category filer to estimate ownership. In particular, we treat Category 4 filers as owning 50 percent and Category 5 filers as owning 10 percent of the subsidiary's assets. This should represent a lower bound of ownership, as the actual ownership for each category may be, and often is, much higher (e.g., 100 percent). Thus, our approach should represent a lower bound in computing proportionate subsidiary assets and thus likely understates the extent of significance. Strictly speaking, it would be possible for a firm to have an investment in a foreign subsidiary that represents a very small fraction of the foreign corporation's total ownership (i.e., less than 10 percent), but which accounts for more than 10 percent of the firm's total consolidated assets. Although we expect this possibility to be unlikely, in such cases, firms would disclose Exhibit 21 subsidiaries and not file a Form 5471, but this would not lead to under-disclosure on Exhibit 21 compared with Form 5471. In some instances, we are unable to infer the percentage ownership of a firms' assets. This is particularly true when the data suggest that, for example, "9999" or "99999" of the subsidiary is owned by the parent. This could be inferred to be 99.99%, 9.999%, 0.9999%, or as an indicator for a missing value. We generally interpret these values as 99.99%, as that type of ownership is common in subsidiary ownership when technical reasons preclude a fully owned subsidiary. Discarding these difficult to interpret values does not affect our conclusions. 19 To the extent firms ignore the requirement to file form 5471, we will not capture every case of under-disclosure on the Exhibit 21. However, when we observe a 5471 disclosure for a subsidiary that is large enough to constitute a significant subsidiary, and, do not observe a corresponding Exhibit 21 disclosure, we take this as evidence of a firm not disclosing an existing subsidiary for financial accounting purposes.
days following the IRS' notification that failure to comply has occurred (Rojas and Slonina, 2015) .
Much more importantly, failing to file the Form 5471 causes the taxpayers' entire corporate income tax to remain subject to audit, effectively halting the statute of limitations from ending the IRS' ability to examine the return (IRC §6501(c) (8)). Additionally, Form 5471 data are private, available only to IRS employees and contractors, and as such, these disclosures do not create publicity-related risks for firms. 
Compustat and Other Datasets
We gather all firm-level financial variables from Compustat. These variables include tax expense and pre-tax income to be able to compute GAAP ETR and the auditor of the firm in each year. We also obtain the value of the firm's tax loss carry-forward, the total assets of the firm, leverage, the book value and market value of the firm, and the property plant, and equipment of the firm. In addition to these Compustat variables, for our main analysis, we also obtain the number of analysts that cover the firm from IBES, and the number of media articles about the firm from Ravenpack.
Final Dataset
We aggregate data from Form 5417 and Exhibit 21 such that we have one observation per firm per year per country. Using Form 5471, we create an indicator variable if a given firm-year has a significant subsidiary in a given country in a given year. Using Exhibit 21, we create an indicator variable if a firm disclosed a subsidiary in a given country in a given year. Thus, for the majority of our analyses, the unit of analysis is firm-year-country.
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After aggregating the data at this level, we merge the three datasets (Form 5471, Exhibit 21, and Compustat). We merge data obtained from the IRS with data from Compustat using Employer Identification Number (EIN), which is disclosed in tax filings and on Form 10-K, and hence available in Compustat. We merge the Exhibit 21 data to the Compustat and 5471 data based on the firm CIK number, also available in Compustat. The final sample consists of more than 125,000 firm-country-year observations that have sufficient data for our models.
Disclosure of Significant Subsidiaries on Exhibit 21

Graphical Evidence
We begin by examining temporal trends in Exhibit 21 reporting relative to firms' actual subsidiary locations as reflected in their Form 5471 filings. In Figure 2 , we plot the percentage of instances, by year, in which a firm fails to disclose a subsidiary in a given country when data from Form 5471 suggest one should have been disclosed (Undisclosed Significant Country). We plot the line separately for tax haven and non-tax haven countries. The figure shows that, in the 2005 about 1.5 percent of observations that should have disclosed a significant subsidiary in a tax haven country did not, with the percentage increasing to over 2.0 percent in 2013. In contrast, the level and the trend for undisclosed subsidiaries in non-tax haven countries is lower and flat. These findings are consistent with the increase in public pressure against firms' tax planning activities, as well as the increase in media interest in covering tax planning activities by firms (Graham et al. 2014 ).
In Figure 3 we plot the percentage of firm-country-years that have omitted disclosure of a significant subsidiary when Form 5471 suggests one should have been disclosed. In the figure, hollow dooted bars represent tax haven countries and black solid bars represent non-tax haven countries. We sort the countries by the percentage of instances of non-disclosure, with the countries with the highest nondisclosure on the left of the graph. For this graph, we depict the 25 countries with the most nondisclosure (omitting countries with less than 30 firm-country-year observations). Of the top ten countries by nondisclosure, eight are tax haven countries, with the U.K. and Germany being the only non-tax haven countries to make the top ten. 22 For more than four percent of firm-country-year observations in Macau, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the Netherlands firms have at least one subsidiary with assets that exceed 10 percent of the parent firm's total assets, but the firms appear to not disclose this presence in their Exhibit 21. Of note also is that the two tax haven nations with the lowest percentage of undisclosed significant subsidiaries are Singapore and Hong Kong are also large, economically vibrant nations with large populations, where firms may legitimately operate absent tax considerations. The concentration of tax havens on the left of the graphs is consistent with strategic nondisclosure by firms.
Determinants of Failure to Disclose Significant Subsidiary
We complement our graphical evidence by estimating regressions to examine what factors are associated with nondisclosure of significant subsidiaries. Estimating in a regression framework allows us to control for other factors that may influence disclosure choices, as well as examine many factors at the same time. We estimate the following regression, estimated at the firm, i, year, (1) The dependent variable, Undisclosed Significant Country is an indicator variable equal to one if data from Form 5471 suggest the firm has a significant subsidiary in a given country, but no subsidiary in that country is disclosed in Exhibit 21. Tax Haven Country is an indicator variable equal to one if the country is a tax haven country as defined by Dyreng et al. (2015) . We expect the coefficient on Tax Haven Country to be positive if firms are more likely to omit disclosure of a subsidiary located in a tax haven country relative to subsidiaries located in other countries.
It is possible that firms with low reported effective tax rates are more likely to be scrutinized by the media or other public commentators, consistent with widespread and growing attention on tax planning activities of U.S. firms (Graham et al. 2014; Ernst & Young 2014) . To this end, firms with low reported tax rates might incur greater costs when disclosing significant subsidiaries in some countries, and particularly in tax haven countries. As such, we include an indicator variable in the regression equal to one when tax expense divided by pretax income is in the lowest quartile of the distribution of GAAP ETR (Low GAAP ETR Indicator), and interact it with Tax Haven Country. We expect the coefficient on Low GAAP ETR Indicator to be negative if the costs of subsidiary disclosures are higher when reported tax rates are low, and we expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative if subsidiaries in tax haven countries are particularly costly to disclose when the firm has a low reported tax rate.
We expect that firms may be more willing to withhold disclosure of subsidiaries in risky countries (such as Ecuador, Venezuela, or Zimbabwe) because the costs of disclosing operations in those types of countries might be higher than other countries. Political Risk Index is an index, from 0 to 100, that is increasing in the political risk of a country-year. We obtain this measure from Political Risk Services, which has 17 different risk components, including factors such as possible equity restrictions, exchange controls, changes to fiscal and/or monetary policy, labor costs and requirements, external borrowing liabilities, etc., along with the political risk inherent in a country. 23 As the Political Risk Index is not available for all countries in our sample we replace
Political Risk Index equal to zero for missing country-years, and set the indicator variable, Political Risk 0, equal to zero (Greene 2003) . We expect Political Risk Index to have a positive association with Undisclosed Significant Country.
We expect that media coverage also increases the cost of subsidiary disclosure. To capture this effect, we create the variable LN(Media Articles), which is the natural log of 1 plus the number of media articles for the firm-year in dj_equities file in Ravenpack on WRDS. 24 We expect the coefficient on LN(Media Articles) to be positive in Equation (1). As with Political Risk Index, as we do not have Ravenpack data for our entire sample, we set LN(Media Articles) equal to zero and we include an indicator variable, Articles 0, if the firm is not covered in Ravenpack.
We expect firms with high quality auditors to have less flexibility in skirting the disclosure rules imposed by the SEC that govern the information contained in Exhibit 21 because prior research has argued that the Big 4 audit firms provide more rigorous audits than other audit firms (Francis et al. 1999; Francis and Yu 2009; Lennox and Pittman 2010) . Therefore, we include the indicator Big 4 Auditor, coded one for firms audited by a Big 4 auditor, zero otherwise. We expect the coefficient on Big 4 Auditor to be negative.
Relatedly, we include an indicator variable coded to equal one if the firm has a new auditor in a given year (New Auditor). We expect the coefficient on New Auditor to be positive, as firms 23 For more details, see https://www.prsgroup.com/category/risk-index. 24 We look only at firms with Country_Code="US" and relevance=100.
that experience an audit change may experience a less rigorous audit (Bockus and Gigler 1998; Zhan Shu 2000) . In addition, we include the natural log of 1 plus the number of financial analysts following the firm (numest in I/B/E/S of the final forecast for the year; we set missing values of numest to zero), LN(Analyst), as a proxy for capital market pressure.
Finally, survey evidence suggests that public pressure related to firms' tax activities appears to be increasing over time (Ernst & Young 2014) . To examine such a time trend, we include a variable equal to the tax year minus 2004, the year before our sample period begins (Time Trend) in Equation (1). To the degree firms increasingly underdisclose potentially significant countries in Exhibit 21 in response to growing public pressure and scrutiny of corporate tax activities, we expect the coefficient on Time Trend to be positive.
We also include several control variables in our regression specifications. We include the size of assets held in subsidiaries in the country (LN(Country Assets)) to control for the possibility that certain countries may simply have fewer operations on average and thus, may be less likely to be included in Exhibit 21 on average. In addition, we include firm-year level controls for whether the firm has an NOL, the size of the parent firm (consolidated book assets, LN(AT)), the profitability of the parent (ROA) as well as the leverage, growth opportunities, and capital intensity of the parent firm (i.e., Leverage, Book to Market, and Capital Intensity, respectively). country. This result is consistent with firms acting to avoid tax-related reputational costs and responding to incentives to prevent external, non-regulator, parties from gathering information on their tax planning using information in Exhibit 21.
We find the coefficient on Low GAAP ETR Indicator is not significantly different from zero, but the interaction between Tax Haven Country and Low GAAP ETR Indicator is marginally significant (p = 0.0762) and negative, suggesting that firms with low reported tax rates are more likely to withhold disclosure of significant subsidiaries if the subsidiaries are located in a tax haven country.
We find the coefficient on LN(Media Articles) is 0.0024 (p = 0.0026), suggesting that the more media coverage the firm receives, the more likely it is to withhold disclosure. In contrast, the coefficient on LN(AT) is negative, suggesting that larger firms are less likely to withhold disclosure. As larger firms likely receive more media coverage, on average, one concern is that media coverage merely captures the size of the firm. However, the opposing signs of the coefficients on LN(Media Articles) and LN(AT) suggests that LN(Media Articles) is not merely capturing firm size.
We find the coefficient estimate on Political Risk Index is positive (0.0002) and significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that firms are more reticent to disclose significant subsidiaries located in politically risky countries. This result also suggests that firms believe subsidiary location disclosures provide more information than simply a glimpse into the tax avoidance strategy.
We find the coefficient estimate on Big 4 Auditor is -0.0098 and significant (p = 0.004),
suggesting that firms with larger, higher quality auditors are less likely withhold disclosure of a significant subsidiary. This result suggests auditors partially mitigate the risk of nondisclosure, all else equal. Although the coefficient on New Auditor is insignificant (p > 0.10), we find the coefficient on LN(Analyst) is negative (-0.0013) and marginally significant (p = 0.070), suggesting that capital market pressure and external scrutiny related to analyst coverage is associated with lower likelihood of nondisclosure.
Overall, the results in Table 2 provide evidence that subsidiary disclosures omitted from Exhibit 21 are not random. Indeed, the results suggest that firms are sensitive to costs imposed by public scrutiny of subsidiary locations, particularly if subsidiaries are in tax haven countries or politically risky countries. But we also find that high quality audits and analyst coverage are associated with decreases in the probability of nondisclosure. We report the results of these tests in Table 3 . We find that the coefficients on both 
Alternative Dependent Variables Based on Haven Country Designation
In the previous section, we observe a positive relation between media coverage and subsidiary nondisclosure. To the extent this relation is driven by negative publicity of tax avoidance strategies, we expect the relation to be particularly salient for subsidiaries in tax haven countries. To test this conjecture, we estimate two regression specifications identical to Eq. (1), but where we replace the dependent variable Undisclosed Significant Country with one of two new dependent variables, Undisclosed Significant Tax Haven Country or Undisclosed Significant NonTax Haven Country. Given that we construct these alternative dependent variables with reference to whether the country is a tax haven, we omit Tax Haven from the regressions. If our conjecture is correct, we expect a positive relation between media coverage and nondisclosure of subsidiaries in tax haven countries, but no relation between media coverage and nondisclosure of subsidiaries in non-tax haven countries.
We report the results of these tests in Table 4 . In column 1, we find that LN(Media Articles) has a positive association with Undisclosed Significant Tax Haven Country (p < 0.001), suggesting that more media coverage results in less disclosure of firms' significant presence in a tax haven nation. However, in column 2, we do not find evidence that LN(Media Articles) is significantly different from zero (p > 0.10), suggesting that media pressure does not explain firms' Exhibit 21
reporting decisions of non-tax haven subsidiaries. These results suggest that firms strategically omit disclosures that could be used by the media to publicize their tax avoidance strategies.
Is Significant Non-Disclosure Indicative of Other Corporate Behavior?
We have documented that some firms systematically omit significant subsidiaries when they face reputational or other incentives to do so. Left unanswered is whether these omissions are symptomatic of larger disclosure or accounting choices at the firm. On the one hand, firms may make isolated subsidiary disclosure decisions to mitigate the reputational costs related to tax avoidance. On the other hand, some firms may frequently make accounting and disclosure choices that push the boundaries of or violate accounting and disclosure rules.
To test whether omitting a significant subsidiary is symptomatic of other accounting choices, we examine whether omitting significant subsidiaries from Exhibit 21 is associated with two outcomes that prior accounting literature has associated with low accounting or disclosure quality: 1) financial accounting restatements and 2) receiving a comment letter from the SEC (e.g., Dechow et al. 2015; Cassell et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2015) . We measure accounting restatements using the Audit Analytics non-reliance restatements database and measure comment letters using the Audit Analytics comment letters database. We estimate the following regression: Overall, the evidence in these analyses suggest that firms that hide significant subsidiaries are more likely to restate their financial statements and more likely to receive SEC comment letters and SEC tax related comment letters.
These analyses are tests of association, with no clear source of identification. Nevertheless, for governmental regulators such as the IRS or SEC, which are tasked with regulating firm behavior and enforcing the law, these results suggest that comparing public data to private data, and focusing on firms whose public data does not reconcile with their private data, may be fruitful, and should be more deeply studied.
Online Appendix
A growing literature uses Exhibit 21 disclosures to measure firm exposure to different countries, including whether firms use tax havens (e.g., Akamah et al. 2017; Dyreng and Markle 2016; Lisowsky 2010; De Simone et al. 2017; Heckemeyer et al. 2017; Dyreng et al. 2015; Bozanic et al. 2017; Demere et al. 2016; Law and Mills 2017; Chow et al. 2017; Law and Mills 2014; Hanlon et al. 2015; Dyreng and Lindsey 2009; Dyreng et al. 2013; Dyreng et al. 2012; Black et al. 2014; Dyreng et al. 2017 ). As our data show that subsidiary omissions from Exhibit 21 are not random, we provide an online appendix to offer additional insights on using Exhibit 21 data as proxies for actual subsidiary locations. In interpreting these supplementary results, we note that the firms most sensitive to reputation and related costs may be the firms of interest in many tax studies.
Conclusion
We undertake the first comprehensive study of information contained in Exhibit 21, comparing firms' true subsidiary locations obtained via tax filings with the firms' disclosed subsidiary locations from Exhibit 21. First, we establish that in hundreds of cases, firms omit significant subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21. Recognizing that firms face reputational costs by revealing themselves as engaging in tax planning, we first examine whether this nondisclosure of significant subsidiaries is more likely to happen if subsidiaries are located in tax havens. We find that the likelihood that a significant subsidiary is apparently not disclosed more than doubles when the subsidiary is in a tax haven, consistent with a reputational cost of tax planning. This propensity to omit disclosure of subsidiaries in tax havens more than triples if the tax haven subsidiary is one whose primary purpose is likely the concealment of taxes-one located in so called Dot havens such as the Cayman Islands or the Bahamas.
Next, as reputational costs are likely driven in part by media coverage, we examine whether media coverage drives this the propensity to underdisclose significant subsidiaries in Exhibit 21
and we find evidence suggesting that it does. Further, we find that media coverage only drives underdisclosure of subsidiaries located in tax havens-we do not observe an effect on the probability of not disclosing significant subsidiaries that are not in tax havens. Finally, we examine whether firms omit disclosure of their subsidiaries that are in politically risky countries and find evidence suggesting subsidiaries located in politically risky nations are more likely to be omitted from Exhibit 21 than other subsidiaries.
Overall, we provide evidence that firms weigh the costs of disclosure against the benefits and may only disclose when the costs outweigh the benefits. This general behavior has been welldocumented in the accounting literature (Dye 2001) , but is generally examined with voluntary disclosures. We show that firms may be willing to underdisclose even mandated disclosures to make hide their tax planning behavior and operations in politically risky countries. This behavior is especially interesting given that the IRS has all this information, and more, in tax filings, so the nondisclosure likely has little to do with fear of additional tax authority scrutiny. The firm behavior we observe is consistent with recent survey evidence put forth by EY (2014), which notes that, "Being compliant with the law isn't always good enough if a journalist writes about your taxes…
There is a far higher threshold for public approval of a tax position than there is when you are dealing with a tax auditor." Indeed, EY (2014) finds that 42% of the largest companies surveyed are changing the way they communicate about taxes to external stakeholders. Our findings suggest that some of this change may be obscuring information about tax planning from the public, even if that information is required to be disclosed by law.
Our results have implications for various settings, including policy discussions regarding tax disclosure in general, and more specifically about the public disclosure of country-by-country
reporting. In light of recent regulation in the U.S. and other countries that requires firms to disclose financial information (e.g., income and taxes paid) by country, the findings in this study are relevant to regulators charged with implementing these provisions. 29 Indeed, our findings suggest that publicly disclosed country-by-country reporting requirements may not be fully followed unless the requirements are clearly regulated and rigorously enforced. (21)Subsidiaries of the registrant. (i) List all subsidiaries of the registrant, the state or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization of each, and the names under which such subsidiaries do business. This list may be incorporated by reference from a document which includes a complete and accurate list.
(ii) The names of particular subsidiaries may be omitted if the unnamed subsidiaries, considered in the aggregate as a single subsidiary, would not constitute a significant subsidiary as of the end of the year covered by this report. (See the definition of "significant subsidiary" in Rule 1-02(w) ( 17 CFR 210.1-02(w)) of Regulation S-X.) The names of consolidated wholly-owned multiple subsidiaries carrying on the same line of business, such as chain stores or small loan companies, may be omitted, provided the name of the immediate parent, the line of business, the number of omitted subsidiaries operating in the United States and the number operating in foreign countries are given. This instruction shall not apply, however, to banks, insurance companies, savings and loan associations or to any subsidiary subject to regulation by another Federal agency.
17 CFR 210.1-02 (w)Significant subsidiary. The term significant subsidiary means a subsidiary, including its subsidiaries, which meets any of the following conditions: (1) The registrant's and its other subsidiaries' investments in and advances to the subsidiary exceed 10 percent of the total assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries consolidated as of the end of the most recently completed fiscal year (for a proposed combination between entities under common control, this condition is also met when the number of common shares exchanged or to be exchanged by the registrant exceeds 10 percent of its total common shares outstanding at the date the combination is initiated); or (2) The registrant's and its other subsidiaries' proportionate share of the total assets (after intercompany eliminations) of the subsidiary exceeds 10 percent of the total assets of the registrants and its subsidiaries consolidated as of the end of the most recently completed fiscal year; or (3) The registrant's and its other subsidiaries' equity in the income from continuing operations before income taxes, extraordinary items and cumulative effect of a change in accounting principle of the subsidiary exclusive of amounts attributable to any noncontrolling interests exceeds 10 percent of such income of the registrant and its subsidiaries consolidated for the most recently completed fiscal year.
Figure 1. Downloads of Exhibit 21 by Media Outlets
Notes. The graph depicts the number of Exhibit 21 downloads from 17 different media outlets, using the same methodology as Bozanic et al. (2017) to isolate specific downloaders from the SEC's EDGAR database by using the IP address of the downloader. Notes. This graph depicts the percentage of instances, by year, in which a significant country presence is undisclosed, by tax havens (red line), Non Tax Havens (green line), and the difference between tax havens and non-tax havens (blue line). A firm has a significant undisclosed subsidiary if the firm-country-year has one (or more) subsidiary(ies) that represent more than 10 percent of the firm's consolidated assets, but the firm fails to disclose a subsidiary in that country in the Exhibit 21. Notes. Undisclosed Significant Country is an indicator variable equal one if one for firm-country-year has one (or more) subsidiary(ies) that represent more than 10 percent of the firm's consolidated assets, but the firm fails to disclose a subsidiary in that country in the Exhibit 21. Tax Haven Country is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-country-years located in located in a tax haven country, as defined by Dyreng et al (2015) . Low GAAP ETR Indicator is an indicator variable coded to equal 1 for firms with GAAP effective tax rate (tax expense divided by pretax income, winsorized at 0 and 1) in the lowest quartile of GAAP ETRs. Political Risk Index is an index, from 0 to -100 (we multiply the raw values by -1 so the variable is increasing in political risk) for the given country-year, obtained from Political Risk Services. Political Risk 0 is an indicator equal to zero if data are not available for the given country-year. LN(Media Articles) is one plus the logged number of media articles for the firm-year in Ravenpack (we set missing values equal to zero). Articles 0 is an indicator equal to zero if the firm is not covered in Ravenpack (i.e., where we set the number of articles to zero). Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable coded to equal one for firms audited by a Big 4 auditor. New Auditor is an indicator variable coded to equal one if the firm has a new audit firm. LN(Analyst) is the natural log of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm. Country Assets is the size of assets held in subsidiaries in the country, measured as the natural log of one plus aggregate total assets (in millions) for all subsidiaries of the firm in the given country and year. NOL is an indicator variable equal to one for non-missing, non-zero values of tax loss carryforwards (tlcf in Compustat) in the given year. Time Trend is a count variable equal to 1 for 2005, 2 for 2006, etc. LN(AT) is the natural log of assets at the parent company. Merger or Acquisition is an indicator variable equal to one for firms engaged in a merger or acquisition in the given year. ROA is the (parent) firm's return on assets (pre-tax income, scaled by lagged total assets). Leverage is total long-term debt (dltt) scaled by total assets (at). Book to Market is the book-to-market ratio. Capital Intensity is net PP&E (ppent in Compustat) scaled by total assets (at in Compustat). Notes. Undisclosed Significant Country is an indicator variable equal one if one for firm-country-year has one (or more) subsidiary(ies) that represent more than 10 percent of the firm's consolidated assets, but the firm fails to disclose a subsidiary in that country in the Exhibit 21. Tax Haven Country is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-countryyears located in located in a tax haven country, as defined by Dyreng et al (2015) . Low GAAP ETR Indicator is an indicator variable coded to equal 1 for firms with GAAP effective tax rate (tax expense divided by pretax income, winsorized at 0 and 1) in the lowest quartile of GAAP ETRs. Political Risk Index is an index, from 0 to -100 (we multiply the raw values by -1 so the variable is increasing in political risk) for the given country-year, obtained from Political Risk Services. Political Risk 0 is an indicator equal to zero if data are not available for the given countryyear. LN(Media Articles) is one plus the logged number of media articles for the firm-year in Ravenpack (we set missing values equal to zero). Articles 0 is an indicator equal to zero if the firm is not covered in Ravenpack (i.e., where we set the number of articles to zero). Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable coded to equal one for firms audited by a Big 4 auditor. New Auditor is an indicator variable coded to equal one if the firm has a new audit firm. LN(Analyst) is the natural log of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm. Country Assets is the size of assets held in subsidiaries in the country, measured as the natural log of one plus aggregate total assets (in millions) for all subsidiaries of the firm in the given country and year. NOL is an indicator variable equal to one for non-missing, nonzero values of tax loss carryforwards (tlcf in Compustat) in the given year. Time Trend is a count variable equal to 1 for 2005, 2 for 2006, etc. LN(AT) is the natural log of assets at the parent company. Merger or Acquisition is an indicator variable equal to one for firms engaged in a merger or acquisition in the given year. ROA is the (parent) firm's return on assets (pre-tax income, scaled by lagged total assets). Leverage is total long-term debt (dltt) scaled by total assets (at). Book to Market is the book-to-market ratio. Notes. Undisclosed Significant Country is an indicator variable equal one if one for firm-country-year has one (or more) subsidiary(ies) that represent more than 10 percent of the firm's consolidated assets, but the firm fails to disclose a subsidiary in that country in the Exhibit 21. Big 7 Tax Haven Country is an indicator variable coded to equal one if the firm-country-year observation is in Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Singapore, or Switzerland, following Hines and Rice (1994) . Dot Tax Haven Country is an indicator variable coded to one if the firm-countryyear observation is located in tax haven (Dyreng et al. 2015) other than a "Big 7" haven defined above. Low GAAP ETR Indicator is an indicator variable coded to equal 1 for firms with GAAP effective tax rate (tax expense divided by pretax income, winsorized at 0 and 1) in the lowest quartile of GAAP ETRs. Political Risk Index is an index, from 0 to -100 (we multiply the raw values by -1 so the variable is increasing in political risk) for the given country-year, obtained from Political Risk Services. Political Risk 0 is an indicator equal to zero if data are not available for the given country-year. LN(Media Articles) is one plus the logged number of media articles for the firm-year in Ravenpack (we set missing values equal to zero). Articles 0 is an indicator equal to zero if the firm is not covered in Ravenpack (i.e., where we set the number of articles to zero). Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable coded to equal one for firms audited by a Big 4 auditor. New Auditor is an indicator variable coded to equal one if the firm has a new audit firm. LN(Analyst) is the natural log of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm. Country Assets is the size of assets held in subsidiaries in the country, measured as the natural log of one plus aggregate total assets (in millions) for all subsidiaries of the firm in the given country and year. NOL is an indicator variable equal to one for non-missing, nonzero values of tax loss carryforwards (tlcf in Compustat) in the given year. Time Trend is a count variable equal to 1 for 2005, 2 for 2006, etc. LN(AT) is the natural log of assets at the parent company. Merger or Acquisition is an indicator variable equal to one for firms engaged in a merger or acquisition in the given year. ROA is the (parent) firm's return on assets (pre-tax income, scaled by lagged total assets). Leverage is total long-term debt (dltt) scaled by total assets (at). Book to Market is the book-to-market ratio. Capital Intensity is is net PP&E (ppent in Compustat) scaled by total assets (at in Compustat). Notes. Undisclosed Significant Tax Haven Country is an indicator variable equal one if one for firm-country-year has one (or more) subsidiary(ies) that represent more than 10 percent of the firm's consolidated assets, the firm fails to disclose a subsidiary in that country in the Exhibit 21, and the country is a tax haven. Undisclosed Significant Non Tax Haven Subsidiary is equivalent to Undisclosed Significant Tax Haven Country, but where the country is not a tax haven. Low GAAP ETR Indicator is an indicator variable coded to equal 1 for firms with GAAP effective tax rate (tax expense divided by pretax income, winsorized at 0 and 1) in the lowest quartile of GAAP ETRs. Political Risk Index is an index, from 0 to -100 (we multiply the raw values by -1 so the variable is increasing in political risk) for the given country-year, obtained from Political Risk Services. Political Risk 0 is an indicator equal to zero if data are not available for the given country-year. LN(Media Articles) is one plus the logged number of media articles for the firmyear in Ravenpack (we set missing values equal to zero). Articles 0 is an indicator equal to zero if the firm is not covered in Ravenpack (i.e., where we set the number of articles to zero). Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable coded to equal one for firms audited by a Big 4 auditor. New Auditor is an indicator variable coded to equal one if the firm has a new audit firm. LN(Analyst) is the natural log of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm. Country Assets is the size of assets held in subsidiaries in the country, measured as the natural log of one plus aggregate total assets (in millions) for all subsidiaries of the firm in the given country and year. NOL is an indicator variable equal to one for non-missing, non-zero values of tax loss carryforwards (tlcf in Compustat) in the given year. Time Trend is a count variable equal to 1 for 2005, 2 for 2006, etc. LN(AT) is the natural log of assets at the parent company. Merger or Acquisition is an indicator variable equal to one for firms engaged in a merger or acquisition in the given year. ROA is the (parent) firm's return on assets (pre-tax income, scaled by lagged total assets). Leverage is total long-term debt (dltt) scaled by total assets (at). Book to Market is the book-to-market ratio. Capital Intensity is net PP&E (ppent in Compustat) scaled by total assets (at in Compustat) that represent more than 10 percent of the firm's consolidated assets, the firm fails to disclose a subsidiary in that country in the Exhibit 21. Undisclosed Significant Tax Haven Subsidiary is an indicator variable equal one if one if the firm, in any year, has one (or more) subsidiary(ies) that represent more than 10 percent of the firm's consolidated assets, the firm fails to disclose a subsidiary in that country in the Exhibit 21, and the country is a tax haven. LN(AT) is the natural log of assets at the parent company averaged over all observations for the firm. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable coded to equal one if the firm was ever audited by a Big 4 auditor. Merger or Acquisition is an indicator variable equal to one for firms that were engaged in a merger or acquisition in the sample period. ROA is the (parent) firm's return on assets (pre-tax income, scaled by lagged total assets), averaged over all observations for the firm. Leverage is total long-term debt (dltt) scaled by total assets (at), averaged over all observations for the firm. Book to Market is the book-to-market ratio, averaged over all observations for the firm. Capital Intensity is net PP&E (ppent in Compustat) scaled by total assets (at in Compustat) averaged over all observations for the firm. LN(Analyst) is the natural log of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm averaged over all observations for the firm. As a straightforward way to examine how large a discrepancy there is between Exhibit 21 disclosures and 5471 disclosures, we provide some descriptive comparisons between Exhibit 21 and Form 5471 data. We start by aggregating the information we have used thus far up to the firmyear level, which is the unit of analysis in most studies that use Exhibit 21 disclosure data. The most common use of Exhibit 21 data is to calculate a variable which indicates whether the firm has operations in any tax haven country in a given year. As a simple test of this proxy, we examine how many firms are misclassified using Exhibit 21 to measure whether the firm has at least one subsidiary in a tax haven. Table A1 , Panel A, depicts that of the 9,622 firm-year observations in our sample that have at least one foreign subsidiary (ignoring significance thresholds) in a tax haven based on Form 5471 disclosures, 10.7% do not disclose any tax haven subsidiaries in Exhibit 21. The usefulness of Exhibit 21 as a proxy for a firm's subsidiary locations is likely tied to the specific question of the study. Our evidence suggests that using Exhibit 21 data would fail to identify over 10 percent of firm-years as having a subsidiary in a tax haven location when they actually have one. Notably, the firms most sensitive to reputation costs are often the firms of interest in many tax studies. That said, we also note that as a proxy, identifying the incidence of tax haven use correctly almost 90 percent of the time suggests that Exhibit 21 likely provides an effective proxy for many settings.
In Figure A1 , we examine the 10.7% of firm/year observations that would be misclassified as not having a tax haven subsidiary if using Exhibit 21 as a proxy for subsidiary locations. For every firm-year-country observation that is in a tax haven where no subsidiary from that firm-yearcountry is reported in Exhibit 21, we graph the ratio of subsidiary assets to parent assets for the largest subsidiary in the tax haven country. The vast majority of these unreported subsidiaries are small, with between 0 and 1% of total firm assets. Indeed, 83.4% of observations are below 2% of parent firm assets, and 94.5% of these subsidiaries have assets that are smaller than 10% of the parent firm assets. These results suggest that in the vast majority of cases in which researchers would misclassify a firm as not having a tax haven subsidiary when the firm actually does have a tax haven subsidiary, the tax haven subsidiary is not significant. While these results do not suggest that these small subsidiaries are not used for tax planning or do not help achieve planning objectives, it does suggest that if using Exhibit 21 as a proxy for tax planning, researchers will capture nearly all of firms' tax haven subsidiaries that represent a significant portion of parent assets.
In Panel B of Table A1 , we provide further descriptive evidence that enables researchers to compare what is measured with Exhibit 21 to what is reported on Form 5471 (again, not conditional on the SEC definition of significance). We compare the total number of foreign subsidiaries, and total number of all tax haven subsidiaries from Exhibit 21 with the corresponding numbers from Form 5471. Using Exhibit 21, we find that the mean firm-year has 31.9 foreign subsidiaries, and 7.9 of which are in tax haven. 30 Form 5471 reveals that the mean firm-year has 43.2 subsidiaries in total, and of those, 9.6 are in tax havens. These results suggest that, as can be expected, many firms do not report all their foreign subsidiaries on Exhibit 21, and as a result, if researchers use Exhibit 21 to proxy for the firms real set of subsidiaries, they will undercount the number of true subsidiaries. Figure A2 , Panel A, depicts the distribution of the number of foreign subsidiaries as reported on Exhibit 21 (solid black bar), and Form 5471 (non-solid bar) for firm-years in our sample. More firms report between 1 and 10 subsidiaries on Exhibit 21 than on Form 5471, while in nearly every other category firms report more subsidiaries on Form 5471, consistent with the evidence in Table A1 , Panel B, where firms do not report many of their foreign subsidiaries on Exhibit 21. However, in Panel B of Figure A1 , when we limit the graph to only disclosed tax haven subsidiaries, in nearly every non-zero category, firms disclose more tax haven subsidiaries on Form 5471 than on Exhibit 21. This figure makes clear that when using Exhibit 21 to depict the firms true set of subsidiaries, many firms will be classified as having a fewer number of subsidiaries, and that this result is especially true when examining the total number of tax haven subsidies.
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Figure A1. Distribution of Asset Size for Undisclosed Tax Haven Subsidiaries
Notes. This figure depicts the size, in terms of percentage of total parent size, for the largest subsidiary in every country/year/firm observation in countries that are tax havens, where the country/firm/year is disclosed as having a subsidiary on Form 5471, but is omitted from Exhibit 21. 
